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CASENOTE
REASSESSING "OVERFILING"-CAN THE EPA PUNISH VIOLATORS UNDER RCRA
WHEN A STATE HAS ALREADY TAKEN ACTION?
United States v. Power Engineering Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
Put simply, overfiling occurs when two agencies take action in response to one violation of
the law.2 These two agencies often include the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and a state agency that is authorized to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program
within the state's borders. When a person or organization violates hazardous waste laws, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") permits both agencies to take action. 3
However, RCRA does not make clear whether one agency4 is permitted to take action once the other
agency' has already taken action for the same incident. In 1999, the Eighth Circuit held in Harmon
Industries, Inc. v. Browner6 that RCRA does not allow the EPA to overfile.7 However, the EPA and
federal district courts did not uniformly follow this decision throughout the country.8 In US v. PEC,
the Tenth Circuit limited Harmon and held that in most situations RCRA allows the EPA to
overfile. 9
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case arose when the EPA filed suit against Power Engineering Company ("PEC").m The
EPA demanded financial assurances regarding PEC's liability for several hazardous waste violations
and demanded compliance with the applicable Colorado hazardous waste laws." The suit was filed
in addition to a suit that the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment ("CDPHE")
had previously filed against PEC; the suits were identical except that CDPHE's did not demand
financial assurances.12 This case dealt with whether the EPA may "overfile" a state enforcement
action. 1
303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
See infta n. 13.
For a further explanation of the "action" the EPA and State agency can take, see infra n. 35-36.
This 'overfiling" agency is almost always the EPA.
This -overfiled" agency is almost always the authorized State agency.
191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 902.
See infra nn. 74-84 OR Section Ill-C.
See lifra nn. 119-124.
0 The EPA also named as defendants Redoubt, Ltd., (the company that owned the land and buildings that
PEC leased) and Richard Lilienthal (an officer of both PEC and Redoubt, Ltd., as well as the sole shareholder
of both companies). PEC, 303 F.3d at 1235.
" Id.
12 Id. at 1235-36.
1 The 10th Circuit defined "overfiling" in this context as "the EPA's process of duplicating enforcement
actions." Id. at 1236. The District Court below said overfiling occurs when "the federal government initiates
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When CDPHE discovered that PECl 4 was discharging hexavalent chromium into the Platte
River, CDPHE inspected PEC's activities and determined that PEC's discharge was also
contaminating groundwater in Denver.16 It further found that PEC was treating, storing, and
disposing of hazardous waste without a permit.' 7 CDPHE brought initial action to force
compliance. Two years later it issued a Final Administrative Compliance Order requiring PEC to
comply with hazardous waste laws, implement a cleanup plan for chrome-contaminated soil, conduct
frequent inspections, and submit periodic reports.19 When PEC failed to comply. CDPHE filed suit
in Colorado state court to force compliance.:o The Colorado state court held that the Final
Administrative Compliance Order was valid.
Before CDPHE had issued its Final Administrative Compliance Order., however, the EPA
requested that CDPHE also demand financial assurances from PEC.22 CDPHE declined to do so.2 3
As a result, the EPA filed its own suit against PEC in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, demanding compliance with CDPHE's Administrative Compliance Order as well as
financial assurances.24
25The EPA and PEC filed cross-motions for summary judgment. PEC claimed that the EPA
did not have the authority to overfile a state enforcement action.26 The district court granted
summary judgment for the EPA and held that the overfiling was permissible, and that PEC must
provide financial assurances. 2 7 The Tenth Circuit upheld this decision, reasoning that when the
administering agency reasonably interprets an ambiguous statute, the court should defer to the
agency's interpretation. 2 8 Applying the reasoning to the facts of the present case, the court held that
when the agency interprets an ambiguous statute to permit overfiling, and the case is not one in
which resjudicata prohibits overfiling,29 the court will find that the overfiling is permissible.30
an enforcement action after a state government begins an action on the same matter." US. v. Power Eng 'g
Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (D. Colo. 2000).
14 PEC is a metal refinishing and chrome electroplating business, which has operated in Denver, Colorado.
since 1968. It produces over 1000 kilograms of waste each month, including arsenic, lead. mercury. and




18 Id. The first notice of violation was issued on June 11, 1993. CDPHE later issued an Initial Compliance
Order in July 1994. Id.
I9 Id.
2 0 Id.
21 Id. The Colorado state court also found that CDPHE's Administrative Penalty Order requiring PEC to pay
$1.13 million was enforceable. Id.
22 Id. This demand was pursuant to the RCRA and corresponding Colorado statutes. Id. See 42 U:S.C. 6901-
6992(k); 6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 et. seq. Plaintiff United States believed that Defendant Lilienthal was
trying to divest himself of his assets and might "leave the country, declare bankruptcy. or liquidate Defendant
PEC." PEC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (D. Colo. 1999). Therefore it requested CDPHE seek financial
assurance from PEC in the amount of $3,500,000 pursuant to 6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 Sec. 266. Id.
23 id.
24 id
25 Id. at 1054.
26 id.
27 Id The district court also held that PEC had to obtain liability coverage for accidental occurrences. Id.
21 Id. at 1237.
29 Id. at 1241.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Overfiling before Harmon
Both the EPA and state environmental agencies enforce hazardous waste laws. Individual
states may develop and administer their own hazardous waste programs after they receive EPA
32approval. When the EPA approves a program, the "State is authorized to carry out [its] program in
lieu of the Federal program.. .and to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal
of hazardous waste . . . ."33 Further, "[a]ny action taken by a State under a hazardous waste program
authorized under [RCRA] shall have the same force and effect as action taken by the [EPA] .. ..
Upon discovering that a person or an entity is violating hazardous waste laws, the EPA or
state may assess civil penalties, require future compliance, or both.35 The EPA or state may also file
a lawsuit in the proper United States district court to seek the appropriate relief.36 However, if the
EPA takes action in a state with an authorized program, the EPA must first provide the state with
notice.37
After authorizing a state program, the EPA can withdraw its authorization if the EPA
determines that the state has failed to take appropriate enforcement action in accordance with the
requirements of RCRA. However, the EPA has rarely, if ever, exercised this option.39 The EPA
has been more likely to exercise a second option-overfiling.
There are two general issues raised in questions of overfiling. 4 0 The first deals with whether
the EPA has the statutory authority to take or continue enforcement action when a state with an
approved program has already taken action. 4 1 The EPA has historically interpreted the RCRA
statute to mean that the EPA has the authority to overfile. 42 In 1986, the legal counsel to the EPA
Administrator rendered a legal opinion on this issue and concluded that RCRA authorizes the EPA
to bring an action in an authorized state even if the state has already prosecuted the same person for
30Id.
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000).
33 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).
.,6
3 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2).
~8See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e). The EPA must first provide notice and offer the State a chance to take corrective
action. Id.
3 See U.S. GAO, EPA and the States-Environmental Challenges Require a Better Working Relationship,
GAO/RCED-95-64, 18 (1995).40 In the 1970s, the first Federal appellate court to address the issue of EPA overfiling was the Sixth Circuit,
in Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). In that case, the court discussed overfiling
hypothetically in a footnote, stating that "It would seem to us that the court which first acquired jurisdiction of
enforcement proceedings would have exclusive jurisdiction to proceed to determine the litigation, and its
judgment would be resjudicata of the issues litigated." Id. at 167.
" See e.g. Harmon Inhdus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1999).
4 The EPA is the agency that Congress has charged with the administration of RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6912
(2000). Because of this express charge, any statutory silence or ambiguity shall result in judicial acceptance
of the agency's interpretation of the statute, provided the interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
125
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the same violations.43 Numerous agency decisions by the Environmental Appeals Board since that
time have affirmed this position. 44
The Federal appellate courts, however, have not agreed with the EPA. In Aorthside Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas.4 5 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the EPA could bring an
enforcement action when a state had already taken action. The court stated, in dicta, that " ... so long
as the State has exercised its judgment in a reasonable manner and within its statutory authority, the
EPA is without authority to commence an independent enforcement action or to modify the
agreement."46 Thus, until Harmon, no clear answer existed as to whether the EPA had the statutory
authority to overfile when a state had already taken action.
The second main overfiling issue is whether res judicata prohibits the EPA from overfiling
under RCRA.4 7 Under the doctrine of res judciata, "a final action on the merits bars further claims
by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action."48 No federal appellate court before
Harmon had decided an overfiling case involving RCRA, but the Ninth Circuit did decide the issue
with regard to the Clean Water Act.49 That court held in ITT Rayonier that res judicata bars a federal
enforcement action following a resolution of the same issues in state court.:o The ITT Rayonier
Court held that "where a state court has entered a final judgment on an identical issue, the EPA
cannot invoke [the corresponding federal statute] to avoid any preclusive effect that judgment may
have." 5' Further, the court stated that "the delicate partnership" between the federal and state
governments would be strained if the Federal government could re-litigate identical claims that
states have already litigated. 2
B. Overfiling under Harmon
Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner was the first federal appellate court decision to address
the issue of overfiling under RCRA in the context of consecutive enforcement actions. 53 In that
case, decided in 1999, the Eighth Circuit held that the EPA lacked the statutory authority to overfile
under RCRA.54 The Harmon case involved a Missouri company that was dumping hazardous waste
behind its facility, prompting the Missouri Department of Natural Resources to take action. 7 While
43 See In re: Bil-Dry Corp., 2001 EPA App. LEXIS 1, *31.
44 See e.g. In re: Gordon Redd Lumber Co., 1994 EPA App. LEXIS 29; In the Matter of Southern Timber
Prod, Inc., 1990 EPA App. LEXIS 23.
45 804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1986).
46 Id. at 382.
47 See e.g. Harmon 191 F.3d at 902.
48 US. v. I7TRayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Montana v. US., 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979)).
49 In the context of overfilling, RCRA and the Clean Water Act are very similar statutes. Both represent
environmental programs that the EPA administers by giving a substantial amount of responsibility to the
states, while still retaining the ability to bring its own enforcement action. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1344(q) (2000).
50 ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1002.
s' Id.
52 See id. at 1001 (quoting Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1284 (5th Cir. 1997)).
5 See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 898.
5 See id. at 902. It also established a fact pattern in which resjudicata barred the EPA from overfiling under
RCRA. Id. at 902-04.
5 Id. at 896-97.
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the company was cooperating with the state in developing a cleanup plan, the EPA instituted an
enforcement action of its own.56
The court first examined whether the RCRA statute gives the EPA the authority to overfile.57
The court held it did not give such authority, basing its holding on six factors. First, because "the
administration and enforcement of ... program[s] are inexorably intertwined," the "in lieu of'
language found in 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) reaches the statute as a whole. 59 This means that an
authorized state program should operate wholly "in lieu of' the EPA's regulatory program, that
administration and enforcement are not separable such that the state could control one and the EPA
control the other. 60 Second, the fact that the EPA has the authority to withdraw authorization for a
state program evinces Congress' intention that states enforce their own hazardous waste programs. 6 1
Third, harmonizing Sections 6928(a)(1) and (2)62 with Section 6926(e) 63 manifests a Congressional
64intent that the EPA must withdraw authority before it can bring an action of its own. Fourth, the
;same force and effect" language of Section 6926(d) 65 applies to the statute as a whole, because if
Congress had wanted it to apply only to enforcement and not administration, it would have made this
desire clear. 66 Fifth, the word "or" used in Section 6972(b)(1)(B) of RCRA indicates that Congress
did not contemplate competing enforcement actions between the EPA and the states.67 Sixth,
legislative history shows Congress intended to vest primary enforcement authority for RCRA in the
states.68
The court also examined whether res judicata barred the EPA from overfiling.69 The court
found that, because the state program operated "in lieu of' the federal program, the state's action has
"the same force and effect" as the federal action, and thus, "the two parties stand in the same
relationship to one another." 70 As privity exists when two parties advance the same legal right,7 and
Missouri advanced the same legal right under RCRA as the EPA did under RCRA, the identity of the
parties was the same. and res judicata therefore foreclosed the EPA's enforcement action against
Harmon.72
56 Id. at 897.
8 Id at 902.
Id. at 899. (emphasis added) See supra n. 33.
6o See id.
61 See id.
62 See supra nn11. 35 and 37. This section addresses the EPA's ability to bring enforcement actions.
See supra n. 38. This section addresses the EPA's ability to withdraw a State program's authorization.
The Harmon court refers to this as Section 6926(b), but Section 6926(e) actually deals with the EPA's ability
to wvithdraw\ authorization for a State program. See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899.61 Harmon. 191 F.3d at 899.
See supra n. 34.
66 Id.
Id. at 900-901. In 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (2000), individual citizens are forbidden from taking any action
"if the [EPA] or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court.. .to
require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order."(emphasis added).
68 Harmon, 191 F.3d at 901.
69 Id. at 902.
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C. Overfiling after Harmon
Even after the Eighth Circuit held overfiling to be invalid in Harmon, the EPA maintained
that it still had the ability to overfile.73 In a 2001 Environmental Appeals Board decision, the EPA
said, "[i]t is well settled that, even when the authorized State has taken action, RCRA nevertheless
authorizes the [EPA] to take its own action. Harmon has not offered any persuasive reasons to open
this well-established reading of the statute, and we decline to do so."74
Some district courts have helped the EPA maintain its pro-overfiling stance. In US. v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc.," the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
accepted the EPRA's interpretation of Harmon,76 but distinguished cases in which a judgment on the
merits or consent judgment has been issued (i.e. Harmon), from.the state's mere initiation of an
action under RCRA. In U.S. v. Flanagan,8 the District Court for the Central District of California
interpreted Harmon as being "not about if, but about when" the EPA can overfile. 79 Finally, in U.S.
v. Power Engineering Company,8 0 the Colorado District Court concluded that the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of RCRA was "flawed" 8' and refused to apply it to the case, 8 2 a conclusion that the
Tenth Circuit has upheld.83
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Tenth Circuit first established that since the EPA is charged with the administration of
RCRA the court should use the Chevron84 method to review the EPA's interpretation of the statute.
Under this method, the court must discern whether Congress has spoken directly to the question at
issue. If Congress has not, the court will accept the agency's interpretation unless it is "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."87 After reviewing Section 6926(b), the court
concluded that the statute was ambiguous,8 8 that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was
reasonable, 89 and that therefore, the court should defer to the EPA's interpretation.90
" See Bil-Dry, 2001 EPA App. LEXIS I at *30.
74 id.
7 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
76 Id. at 11 14.
n Id. The Court further stated that the Eighth Circuit read too much into the phrases "in lieu of' and "same
force and effect," while at the same time giving inadequate effect to the statutory provisions that demonstrate
Congress's intent that EPA have its own independent enforcement authority even in states that have
authorized hazardous waste programs. Id. at 1116.
78 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
" Id. at 1289.
80 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2000)
81 Id. at 1060.
82 See id. at 1071.
83 P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1241.
84 See Chevron US.A., Inc. v. NaIl. Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837.
" P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1236.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1237.
89 Id. at 1238.
90 Id. at 1237.
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To conclude that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable, the court first noted that the statute
consists of two clauses, one dealing with the administration of authorized state programs and the
other with the enforcement of state regulations. 9 1 Because the phrase "in lieu of' appears in the first
clause and not in the second clause, the court held that one could reasonably interpret the statute as
saying that a state is permitted to carry out its program in lieu of the federal program and, also, that
the state can issue and enforce permits.92
The court next examined the Eighth Circuit decision in Harmon, and distinguished that case
by holding that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation did not account for the placement of
enforcement" and "in lieu of' in separate clauses of Section 6926(b).93 The Tenth Circuit further
concluded that the Harmon court did not adequately consider the fact that state enforcement of
regulations is discussed in a different section of RCRA than federal enforcement of regulations.94
Because of this bifurcated statutory structure, the Tenth Circuit found it reasonable to conclude that
the administration and enforcement of RCRA are not inexorably intertwined, and therefore
authorization of a state program does not deprive the EPA of its enforcement powers.95
The court then disagreed with the premise that Section 6926(d) applies to RCRA as a
whole, 96 rejecting the notion that the phrase "same force and effect" reaches the enforcement clause
as well as the administration clause.9 7 The court found that such an interpretation reads too much
into the statute.98 It focused on the fact that Section 6926 applies to state programs, not federal
enforcement.99 By looking at the statutory heading of Section 6926(d)-"Effect of a State
Permit"-the court further concluded that this statute only intends for state permits to have the
'same force and effect" as federal permits.' 00 As a result, the court found that it would be reasonable
to conclude that Congress only intended this section to clarify that recipients of state permits do not
also need to obtain a permit from the EPA. 0' Thus, the court found that it was reasonable to
conclude that this section provided only that the EPA could not deny the validity of a state permit.
The section did not prevent the EPA from taking action when a violation occurred.' 0 3
9' Id. at 1238.
92 Id.
93 Id.
Id. The Tenth Circuit found significance in the fact that section 6926 addresses the administration and
enforcement of state regulations by authorized states, while the federal enforcement of such regulations is
addressed in section 6928. Id.
i Id. The Tenth Circuit buffers its conclusion by stating that the only way that it could reach the Harmon
holding was by "harmonizing" Sections 6928(a)(1) and (2) (allowing the EPA to bring an enforcement action
in certain situations) with Section 6926(e) (allowing the EPA to withdraw state authorization in certain
circumstances), which it refused to do. If one reads the two statutes harmonized, one could conclude that the
EPA had to rescind the state's authority before bringing an action itself. However, the court held that this
interpretation was "well beyond the plain meaning of the statute," since nothing in the statute suggests that
rescinding state authority (an '"extreme" and "drastic" step) is necessary before the EPA can bring an
enforcement action. Id. at 1238-39.
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The court proceeded to discard the notion that, given Congress's use of the word "or" in
Section 6972(b)(1), Congress did not intend for both federal and state governments to pursue the
same action. 4 The court held that the language was "ambiguous at most"10 and did not address the
issue of overfiling.106
Finally, the court dismissed the argument that res judicata barred overfiling.10 7 To do so,
the court had to determine whether the EPA was in privity with CDPHE, and whether the cause of
action was the same in both suits.'0 8 In determining privity, the court recognized that state and
federal governments are usually separate entities for purposes of res judicata,109 but an exception
occurs when the federal government "assumes control over litigation.","l0 Here, the court decided
that the federal government did not assume control over litigation.'" Further, since CDPHE did not
maintain the same position as the EPA (by not seeking financial assurances), the court decided that
privity did not exist.112 Since privity was nonexistent, 1 and the EPA had not assumed control over
the litigation, the court held that res judicata did not prohibit overfiling.1 4
Because RCRA is ambiguous regarding the permissibility of overfiling"' and the EPA is the
agency charged with the administration of RCRA,1 6 the court held that it must defer to the EPA's
reasonable interpretation of the text. 1 7 Because the EPA's interpretation of the statute has
substantial support in the text and is therefore reasonable, 11 and because res judicata does not
prohibit overfiling,ll 9 the court held that the EPA's suit against PEC was permissible even though
CDPHE had already filed a suit in the same action.120
104 Id. at 1240.
105 id.
106 Id. PEC had argued that Congress would have used the phrase "and/or" if it had intended both federal and
state governments to overfile suits. Id. The court held that the word "and" is unnecessary because the statute
clearly states that a suit by either government is sufficient to bar citizen suit. Id.
107 Id. at 1241. The court first established that the Colorado state court decision was a final judgment on the
merits in favor of CDPHE, based on a cause of action brought under RCRA. Id. at 1240.
108 id.
109 Id.
n0 Id. The court listed examples of how the federal government "assume[s] control over litigation,"
including: (1) requiring the lawsuit to be filed; (2) reviewing and approving the complaint; (3) paying the
attorney's fees and costs; (4) directing the appeal from the lower court to the appellate court; (5) appearing
and submitting a brief as amicus; (6) directing the filing of a notice of appeal: and (7) effectuating the
abandonment of an appeal on advice of the solicitor general. The court said that none of these factors were
present in this case. Id. at 1240-41.
." Id. at 1241.
112 id.
113 Since it decided that no privity existed between CDPHE and the EPA, the court felt it did not need to
decide whether the cause of action was the same in both cases. Id.
114 id
"s Id. at 1240.
116 Id. at 1236.
" Id. at 1241.
11 Id. at 1240.
"' Id. at 1241.
120 id
130
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V. COMMENT
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit heard mostly the same arguments, but the two
courts resolved the arguments in opposite ways. The facts in the two cases differed in only one
significant aspect. In Harmon, the EPA brought the same action that the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources did;'21 in PEC, the EPA brought the same action as the Colorado Department
Public Health and Environment did, except that the EPA also asked for financial assurances.122 This
difference turned out to be significant. In Harmon, it made overfiling seem unfair, whereas in PEC,
it made overfiling seem fair. Because allowing overfiling seemed unfair to the Eighth Circuit, the
court decided all the arguments against allowing overfiling. Because allowing overfiling seemed
right to the Tenth Circuit, it decided all the arguments in favor of allowing overfiling. As a
consequence of this results-based reasoning, the two courts slanted their views on some of the minor,
close-call arguments to achieve the outcome desired by each court. An even look at each court's
reasoning shows that no obvious answer exists to the arguments about overfiling.
On the first issue, whether state enforcement operates "in lieu of' EPA enforcement, the two
courts reach differing results' 23 because each court appears to use a different approach to answer the
.question. Both courts ultimately boil the issue down to whether "administration" and "enforcement"
are such closely related concepts that one is necessary for the other.124 In one sense, administration
and enforcement seem necessary to each other, because it would be useless to promulgate
regulations if they were not enforced, and vice versa. This is the approach that the Eighth Circuit
apparently took in deciding that the two are "inexorably intertwined." In a different sense, though,
administration and enforcement might be necessary to each other, but they do not have to be
executed by the same entity. For example, it is not far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which a state
administers environmental regulations that are stricter than the federal regulations, but the state
yields the ultimate responsibility for enforcement of those regulations to the EPA. This is the
approach that the Tenth Circuit apparently adopted in finding that the two were not inexorably
intertwined.
By itself. the Tenth Circuit's reasoning seems more persuasive because it appears to fit the
context of the case. However, it is ultimately too simplistic because it does not account for the
context of the subsection as a whole. The subsection begins with the sentence "Any state which
seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program may [submit an application to the
EPA]."'2 This line seems to indicate that, for the purposes of this subsection, administration and
enforcement are to be executed by one entity - the state. Understood in this context, the Eighth
121 Harmon. 191 F.3d at 897.
22 P.E.C.. 303 F.3d at 1236.
The Harmon court held that administration and enforcement are "inexorably intertwined." 191 F.3d at
899. Therefore the "in lieu of' language of Section 6926(b) reaches the whole act, and consequently a State
program operates in lieu of Federal EPA regulation as to both administration and enforcement. Id. The PEC
court held that "enforcement" and "in lieu of' are in separate clauses of Section 6926(b), thus "in lieu of'
does not reach "enforcement," and a State program operates in lieu of EPA regulation as to only
administration, not enforcement. P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1237. The PEC court further looked to the fact that
state enforcement of regulations is discussed in a different section (Section 6926) than federal enforcement(Section 6928), and thus an interpretation that administration and enforcement are not "inexorably
intertwined" is reasonable. Id. at 1238.
See supra nn. 60 and 100.
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (emphasis added).
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Circuit's interpretation that administration and enforcement are inexorably intertwined is the better
approach.
The second issue that the two courts diverged on was whether it was reasonable to
"harmonize" the section allowing the EPA to bring enforcement actions with the section allowing
the EPA to withdraw authorization of a state program. This harmonization would lead to the
conclusion that the EPA had to rescind the state's authority before bringing action itself. 26 The
Tenth Circuit, rejecting harmonization, seems to have the better logic on this issue. Nothing in the
statute suggests that the EPA has to rescind the authorization of a state program before it can take an
enforcement action. When the EPA rescinds a state program, it is an "extreme" and "drastic" step
that is to be done when the entire state program is ineffective.127 This is not a step the EPA should
take lightly, since it will create an increased administrative/enforcement burden on the EPA itself,
and the EPA's taking on more responsibility is not a step that is likely to improve local
environmental protection overall. Also, authorizing a new state program will take time. Therefore,
overfiling is not a remedy for a state program that is faulty on the whole, but rather it is the EPA's
remedy when a state program has proven inadequate in one particular case.
The third issue the courts diverged on is whether the "same force and effect" language
applies to the statute as a whole or just to state permits.'2 8 Both courts had valid points, because
while the title is "Effect of State Permit," the subsection does not use the word "permit," but rather
the word "action."l 29 The text, when read separately from the title, implies that any action that the
state takes will have the same force and effect as any action the EPA could take. A plain language
reading of the statute would likely lead a reader to interpret "any action" to go beyond merely the
issuance of permits. None of the surrounding sections of RCRA limit the word "action" to
permits.130 The word is used in two contexts: corrective action taken by violators'13 and civil actions
brought by a state or the EPA.13 2 Under the canon of statutory interpretation that dictates that a
particular word used in a statute should be given the same meaning throughout the statute,1 33 it
would seem logical to define "any action taken by a State" 34 as "any lawsuit filed by the State."
This definition would allow the subsection to be interpreted as meaning that a lawsuit filed by a state
shall have the same force and effect as a lawsuit filed by the EPA (so violators do not have to worry
about a lawsuit from both).
126 The Harmon court found this interpretation acceptable and proper. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899. The PEC
court found this interpretation to be "well beyond the plain meaning of the statute." P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1238.
127 See id. at 1239 (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 714 F. Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
128 The Harmon court held that it applied to the whole statute, reasoning that the plain language of the
subsection deals with "any action" the State takes, notjust the issuance of permits. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 900.
The PEC court held that the language applies only to State permits, reasoning that the subsection was
inapplicable to federal enforcement because federal enforcement was addressed in a different section, and
because the subsection title-"Effect of State Permit"-imited the language to permits. See P.E.C., 303 F.3d
at 1239.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).
130 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2000).
"3 See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(i) (2000).
132 See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).
L3 See generally Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) ("... classic case for the application of the
'normal rule of statutory construction "that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning.'")
'3 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).
132
MELPR, Vol. 10, No. 2
On the other hand, the title does address only state permits,135 and Federal enforcement
options are discussed in a completely different section.136 In that light, PEC's reading of the137statute is not unreasonable. However, the language probably does not quite rise to the level of
'"ambiguous at most," as the PEC court said.' 38 Since the rest of Section 6926 deals with
authorization of state programs generally,139 it seems unlikely that Congress would have limited this
particular subsection to deal only with permits.
The fourth issue the courts disagreed on was whether the word "or" meant that Congress did
not contemplate whether both the EPA and the states could bring an enforcement action. The
Harmon court held that Congress' use of"or" meant that Congress did not intend overfiling;140 the
PEC court held that the language was too ambiguous and did not address overfilling.141 In the Tenth
Circuit's favor there are many situations in which "and" can mean "or" and "or" can mean "and." 42
The exact meaning of the term "or" can thus be unclear. Also, Section 6972 deals with suits filed by
individual citizens, not by the EPA or states. 14 3 In this sense, the Tenth Circuit has the better
reasoning on this case.
The fifth issue that the courts disagreed on was whether res judicata prohibits overfiling.
Both courts felt the answer depends on whether privity exists between the state program and the
EPA in the particular situation.144
These two holdings, more than any other issues, were dictated by the facts of the respective
cases. In Harmon, the EPA and Missouri advanced the same issues. 14 5 In PEC, the EPA wanted
financial assurances in addition to the action Colorado had already taken.146 Therefore, res judicata
was only appropriate in the Harmon case, not in PEC. However, the reasoning that the two courts
used was not identical. The PEC court applied a more stringent test for res judicata, one that would
have required the EPA to "assume.. .control over [the] litigation"l 4 7 before res judicata would bar the
EPA from overfiling.14 8 The test that the Harmon court used was fairer, because it actually analyzed
Id.
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928.
'3 PEC's interpretation was that permits issued by a State shall have the same force and effect as permits
issued by the EPA., so that producers do not need to obtain two permits. P.EC., 303 F.3d at 1237.
138 Id. at 1240.
'9 The original Section 6926 contained five subsections, all of which deal with authorization of State
programs in general. Subsection (a) directs the EPA to establish guidelines by which states can develop
hazardous waste programs. Subsection (b) deals with authorization of state programs. Subsection (c)
addresses when interim authorization was appropriate, before January 1986. Subsection (e) focuses on
withdrawal of authorization. Subsections (0, (g), and (h) were added later by amendment. Only the title of
subsection (d)--Effect of State Permit"-indicates otherwise, though the text of subsection (d) addresses
State program "action'* having the same effect as "action'" taken by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a-h).
10 See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 901.
' See P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1240.
142 For example, the sentence "Every student from Kentucky or Tennessee is in this class" means the same
thing as -Every student from Kentucky and Tennessee is in this class."
See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000).
144 See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 902-903.; P.E.C., 303 F.3d at 1240.
14 Harmon, 191 F.3d at 894.
46 P.E.C.. 303 F.3d at 1235-36.
1 Id. at 1240.
In PEC, the court held that, since state and federal governments are generally considered separate partiesfor resjudicata purposes, and since the EPA did not assume control over the litigation, resjudicata did not
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whether the issues and parties were substantially identical, instead of simply deciding that res
judicata almost never applies to the federal government. 149
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the PEC decision is probably better aligned with Congress' intent in passing the
RCRA than that offered by the Harmon court. Because environmental issues vary throughout the
country, Congress felt it needed environmental standards that were broad enough to reach so many
diverse areas. However, the EPA itself was not big enough to administer and enforce all of these
standards on its own. So, Congress delegated some of the authority for doing so. Nonetheless, since
RCRA ultimately established standards for the whole country, the federal government should have
the ultimate responsibility for enforcement. In this sense, overfiling is appropriate.
Luckily for the EPA, Harmon did not turn out to be as limiting as some commentators had
originally feared. 5 0 It was limited basically to prevent the EPA from taking the same action that a
state had already taken, where a court had rendered judgment. In any event, the states that comprise
the Eighth Circuit (including Missouri) are ultimately the only ones bound by the Harmon decision.
Until another federal appellate court or the U.S. Supreme Court rules, the EPA will remain free to
overfile in most situations.
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bar overfiling. Id. at 1240-41. Alternatively, the PEC court held that, since the "in lieu of' language applied
only to administration and not enforcement, the agencies had different interests, and therefore privity did not
exist. Id. at 1241.
149 The Harmon court held that, since privity exists when the two parties have a "close relationship bordering
on near identity," and the plain language permits Missouri to act in lieu of the EPA with its action having the
same force and effect as the EPA's action, the parties are in the same relationship with one another. See 191
F.3d at 503. Therefore the court held that privity existed, and resjudicala barred overfiling. Id.
Iso See generally e.g. Christina Coop, Student Author, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 28 Ecology L.Q.
253, 273 (2001) ("For now, the Harmon decision provides a clear limitation on EPA's ability to overfile
under RCRA.")
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